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JUDGES AND SCHOLARS: DO COURTS AND SCHOLARLY
JOURNALS CITE THE SAME LAW REVIEW ARTICLES?
DEBORAH J. MERRITT* AND MELANIE PUTNAM**
Fred Shapiro's updated compilation of The Most-Cited Law Re-
view Articles demonstrates that legal scholarship commands respect-
or at least high citation rates-among other legal scholars.1 An atten-
tion-getting article will attract hundreds of academic citations during
its lifetime. Indeed, the most-cited articles may garnish the footnotes
of close to a thousand other articles. Legal academics maintain a
healthy appetite for the works of other legal scholars.
Outside academia, the reputation of legal scholarship is not as
glossy. Several appellate judges have denounced contemporary legal
scholarship as increasingly irrelevant to the bench and bar. Judge
Laurence Silberman of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit complained in a recent opinion that
"many of our law reviews are dominated by rather exotic offerings of
increasingly out-of-touch faculty members."'2 Connecticut Supreme
Court Justice Ellen Peters concurs that "there is an increasing diver-
gence between the theoretical interests of the aspiring academic law-
yer and the pragmatic interests of the successful practitioner."'3 These
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discussed in this article. We are also thankful for excellent comments we received on an earlier
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Andrew Merritt, and Barbara Snyder. The Center for Socio-Legal Studies at the College of Law
provided computer assistance for the statistical analyses included in this article.
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1. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
751 (1996) [hereinafter Shapiro, Revisited].
2. United States v. Six Hundred and Thirty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty-Eight
Dollars in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Silberman, J., concurring).
3. Ellen A. Peters, Reality and the Language of the Law, 90 YALE L... 1193, 1193 (1981).
See also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 42 (1992) ("The growing disjunction between legal education
and legal practice is most salient with respect to scholarship. There has been a clear decline in
the volume of 'practical' [legal] scholarship."); Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic
Law Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUc. 313, 320 (1989) ("I am disappointed not to find more in the law
reviews that is of value and pertinence to our cases .... The concern that academics are writing
for each other is indeed well founded."); Patricia M. Wald, Teaching the Trade: An Appellate
Judge's View of Practice Oriented Legal Education, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35, 42 (1986) ("Too few
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judicial expressions of distaste for legal scholarship mirror broader
concerns that a "chasm" has emerged "between the legal academy
and the real world of practice and public policy."
'4
Shapiro's new collection of The Most-Cited Law Review Articles
provides an important opportunity to explore the perceived breach
between legal scholars and judges. Shapiro identifies the law-related
articles most frequently cited in legal and social science journals. Do
judges find the same articles cite-worthy? Or would a list of the most
frequently referenced articles in judicial opinions look far different
from Shapiro's lists?
This article complements Shapiro's research by identifying the
ten articles published in each of three recent years (1989-1991) that
reaped the most judicial citations. After presenting these lists, we of-
fer some preliminary comparisons between the 1989-1991 articles
most frequently cited by judges and the articles published during the
same years most favored by academics. Our comparisons are quite
preliminary; the limited sample size precludes extensive statistical
analysis or firm conclusions. Our tentative observations, however,
raise intriguing questions about differences between the articles most
cited by judges and those most referenced by academic scholars. We
hope these findings will pave the way for more extensive comparisons
of citation patterns in judicial opinions and scholarly journals.
law review articles prove helpful in appellate decision making. They tend to be too talky, too
unselective in separating the relevant from the irrelevant, too exhaustive, too exhausting, too
hedged, too cautious about reaching a definite conclusion.").
4. Peter Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 323, 325 (1989). See also Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educa-
tional Continuum, A.B.A. SEc. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE B. (Rep. Task Force on
Law Sch. & the Prof.: Narrowing the Gap), July, 1992, at 5. ("Practitioners tend to view much
academic scholarship as increasingly irrelevant to their day-to-day concerns."); Craig A. Nard,
Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the Academy and Profession, 30
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347 (1995); David M. Rabban, Does Professional Education Constrain
Academic Freedom?, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 358, 363 (1993) (referring to a "growing gap between
the legal academy and the legal profession"); Louis J. Sirico Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The
Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131, 135
(1986) ("A growing portion of academic writing, particularly in the elite journals, may be di-
rected toward the scholar, rather than the bar or the bench."); Harry H. Wellington, Challenges
to Legal Education: The "Two Cultures" Phenomenon, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 327 (1987).
These criticisms are not entirely new. In 1936, Fred Rodell bade Goodbye to Law Reviews,
23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936), complaining that law reviews focused on esoteric topics such as "'The
Rule Against Perpetuities in Sasketchewan,"' id. at 42, and that "the only consumers of law
reviews outside the academic circle are the law offices, which never actually read them but stick
them away on a shelf for future reference." Id. at 45.
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Citation studies, as Shapiro and others have recognized, have lim-
ited aims.5 The articles included on our lists are not necessarily the
"best" or "most useful" articles published in recent years. They are
not even necessarily the works that judges themselves would name as
the most influential.6 Our focus on most-cited articles may obscure
patterns that would emerge if we examined citations to articles earn-
ing smaller citation totals among scholars or judges.
7
Our comparison affords only one window on the citation prefer-
ences of judges and academics; researchers must combine that per-
spective with other measures to assay the nature of any divide
between courts and the academy.8
I. METHOD
We used Shepard's Law Review Citations to identify the ten arti-
cles published in each of three recent years (1989-1991) that earned
the most judicial citations. Shepard's traces citations to articles pub-
lished in almost 170 different law reviews, representing most accred-
ited law schools and all regions of the country.9 Citations to these
5. Shapiro, Revisited, supra note 1, at 753-54; Joseph Goldstein, Commentary, 100 YALE
L.J. 1485 (1991); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540,
1543-44 (1985) [hereinafter Shapiro, Most-Cited].
6. Our research, like Shapiro's work, omits citations to treatises and other books. Judicial
citations to some books far exceed citations to even the most frequently referenced articles. A
search of the LEXIS MEGA library, for example, revealed that state and federal courts cited
various editions of RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, almost 300 times between 1989 and 1994. Similarly, state and federal courts cited the first
or subsequent editions of WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT more than 1700 times during those six years. During the same time pe-
riod, the most-cited article on our lists elicited only 45 judicial citations.
In addition to this obvious omission, citation studies provide only a rough outline of schol-
arly influence. Some writers do not cite articles that profoundly influenced their thinking, while
others reference works they have never read. See, e.g., Wade H. McCree, Jr., Partners in a Pro-
cess: The Academy and the Courts, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1980); Olavi Maru,
Measuring the Impact of Legal Periodicals, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 227, 230 n.13.
7. We note below, for example, that our lists of the most-cited articles in judicial opinions
include only one article discussing any form of sex or race discrimination-despite the fact that
articles on these topics figure prominently on Shapiro's lists of recent articles most often cited in
scholarly journals. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. The paucity of articles focusing on
sex or race discrimination among the recent articles most cited by the courts might reflect two
very different patterns: (1) that judges rarely cite any recent articles discussing sex or race dis-
crimination; or (2) that judges cite a wide array of articles in this field, and no one article has
garnered enough citations to reach the most-cited list.
8. In addition, care must be taken in attempting to generalize our lists of articles most
cited by judges to other segments of the practicing bar. We counted only citations to law review
articles in judicial opinions-and most of those opinions stemmed from appellate courts. The
articles most frequently cited by appellate judges may differ from the sources trial judges, court-
room litigators, corporate counsels, and other members of the practicing bar find most useful.
9. The 1990-1995 bound supplement in this Shepard's series, which provided most of our
data, lists citations to articles from 167 distinct journals.
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articles are gathered from all federal and state court reporters, as well
as from other articles published by the same law reviews. 10 No other
source systematically collects citations to law review articles in judicial
opinions.11
All three of our lists are current through the 1990-1995 Shepard's
bound supplement; they include citations in judicial opinions issued
through roughly the third quarter of 1994.12 These three lists are
analogous to Shapiro's "top ten" lists for articles published in 1989,
1990, and 1991, and we draw several comparisons between Shapiro's
inventories and our own findings. To facilitate comparison between
the two sets of top-ten lists, we reproduce Shapiro's lists below and
note the number of judicial citations for each of the articles on his
lists.13 Conversely, we recorded the number of law review citations
documented by Shepard's for all of the articles on our three top-ten
lists.
Our 1989-1991 lists differ from Shapiro's lists in at least one im-
portant respect: while we drew our lists from Shepard's, Shapiro
worked primarily from the Social Sciences Citation Index ("SSCI").14
These two sources trace citations to articles drawn from somewhat dif-
ferent pools of journals. Shepard's includes almost 170 legal periodi-
cals, while SSCI encompasses only about 100 of those journals.15
SSCI, on the other hand, includes over one thousand social science
10. See SHEPARD's LAW REVIEW CrrATIONs at viii (4th ed. 1990-95 Supp.) (listing publica-
tions used to gather citations).
11. It is possible to collect citations to an individual article using an electronic database of
judicial opinions, but collecting citations in that manner for the entire universe of law review
articles would be inordinately time-consuming. We used electronic searches to supplement some
of our findings, see infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text, but necessarily relied upon Shep-
ard's for most of our data.
12. See SHEPARD's LAW REVIEW CrrATIONS, supra note 10 at viii (listing reporters covered
by that volume). In counting citations for our lists, we eliminated duplicate citations to the same
judicial opinion appearing in two or more reporters. We also attempted to eliminate multiple
citations to the same article appearing on different pages of the same judicial opinion, although
we counted citations to an article appearing in different opinions (such as a majority and dissent)
in the same case separately. Shepard's itself apparently attempts to winnow these duplicate cita-
tions; we found relatively few instances of multiple citations within the same judicial opinion.
13. A few of the articles on Shapiro's lists appeared in journals that are not tracked by
Shepard's Law Review Citations, We used LEXIS searches to identify judicial citations to each
of these articles.
14. The lists also cover slightly different citation periods. As noted above, our lists count
citations appearing in court opinions through about the third quarter of 1994. See supra note 12
and accompanying text. Shapiro, on the other hand, indicates that his lists count SSCI citations
through May 1995. SSCI is updated weekly, so Shapiro's totals are somewhat more current than
ours are.
15. See Shapiro, Revisited, supra note 1, at 755.
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journals that Shepard's makes no attempt to embrace, as well as a few
prestigious law reviews arbitrarily excluded from Shepard'sJ
6
To test the importance of this difference in our databases, and to
determine how likely courts were to cite articles from journals omitted
from Shepard's, we used LEXIS to gather judicial citations to all
twenty-five articles mentioned by Shapiro that did not appear in Shep-
ard's.17 These articles garnered surprisingly few judicial citations. Ten
never have been cited by the courts, and four others possess only a
single judicial citation. Among articles published since 1982, only two
have reaped more than one court citation, and the most-cited of these
has appeared only five times in judicial opinions.18 Neither of these
articles would have appeared on our most-cited lists. 19
It is possible that courts have cited repeatedly to other articles
falling outside Shepard's ambit; we may have missed one or more arti-
cles that would qualify for our most-cited lists. The low judicial cita-
tion rate for the prominent articles identified by Shapiro, however,
suggests that Shepard's coverage of articles favored by courts is rela-
tively complete. 20 Therefore, we feel comfortable comparing Sha-
piro's lists of the 1989-1991 articles most cited in scholarly journals
with our own lists of 1989-1991 articles most cited by courts.2'
16. Shapiro suggests that some of the most significant omissions from Shepard's are the
Supreme Court Review, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Journal of Legal Stud-
ies, Journal of Law and Economics, and Law and Society Review. Id.
17. Most of these articles appear on one of Shapiro's most-cited lists. For completeness,
however, we also tested six articles that Shapiro mentions but excluded from his own study. See
id. at 756.
18. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) (five judicial citations); Steven Shavell,
Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation
of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL S-UD. 55 (1982) (four judicial citations).
19. Some older articles excluded from Shepard's and identified by Shapiro have accumu-
lated a larger total of citations over their lifetimes. R.H. Coase's 1960 analysis of The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1961), for example, has been cited thirty-eight times in the
courts. The article's first judicial citation, however, did not occur until 1968. Other frequently
cited articles experienced similar delays before obtaining judicial citations. See infra notes 39-42
and accompanying text. Even these articles, therefore, probably would not have appeared on a
list of articles most cited by courts within six years after their publication-the largest time-
frame we tested for articles published between 1989 and 1991.
20. Earlier editions of Shepard's apparently excluded student works. See Shapiro, Most-
Cited, supra note 5, at 1545 n.26. The 1990-95 supplement providing data for our study, however,
included student works. Indeed, two student pieces appear on our most-cited lists. See infra
notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
21. The varying scope of Shepard's and SSCI also affects the sources from which those
citators cull citations. Shepard's traces scholarly citations in the same 170 journals it indexes,
while SSCI includes citations in over two thousand social and natural science journals. On our
lists of the articles most cited by courts, we note law review citations as reported by Shepard's.
To facilitate comparison of those totals with the citation totals reported by Shapiro, we report
the number of journal citations in both "law reviews" (drawn from Shepard's) and "sscr'
1996] .875
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
II. THE 1989-1991 ARTICLES MOST CITED BY THE COURTS
Tables 1-3 display the articles published in 1989, 1990, and 1991
that received the most judicial citations through the third quarter of
1994. The tables also show the number of citations each article accu-
mulated in other law review articles (as measured by Shepard's). The
tables suggest that courts cite law review articles at a relatively low
rate. The 1989-1991 article most frequently cited by the courts has
gathered only forty-five judicial citations,22 while a mere seven judicial
citations qualified an article for our "most cited" list of 1990. In con-
trast, the most-cited article on Shapiro's 1989-1991 lists has reaped al-
most two hundred citations in scholarly journals,23 and articles needed
at least forty-five journal citations to qualify for any of Shapiro's re-
cent most-cited lists.
The difference in citation rates among judges and academic au-
thors is particularly striking because courts publish so many more
opinions-and thus offer more opportunities for citation-than law
reviews publish articles. 24 The higher number of scholarly citations
may reflect the tendency of law review writers to burden their articles
sources (as reported by Shapiro) for the articles on Shapiro's lists. For articles on Shapiro's lists
that do not appear in Shepard's, we searched for law review citations on LEXIS. These searches
do not duplicate precisely Shepard's coverage, but are reasonably similar.
The citation totals culled from Shepard's and SSCI usually follow a similar pattern, with the
number of law review citations somewhat lower than the number of SSCI citations. A few arti-
cles, however, have been much more widely cited in the social science literature than in law
reviews (at least as chronicled by Shepard's), while other works have reaped more citations from
traditional law reviews than from the journals tracked by SSCI. Kimberld Crenshaw's 1989 arti-
cle on Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, for example, has been even more widely
cited in the law reviews covered by Shepard's than in the social science journals listed in the
Social Sciences Citation Index. Kimberl6 Crenshaw. Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and An-
tiracist Politics, 1989 U. Ci. LEGAL F. 139 (1989). Crenshaw's article, with 93 SSCI citations,
ties for seventh on Shapiro's list of the most-cited articles of 1989. If the articles on Shapiro's list
were reordered according to their law review citations (as reflected in Shepard's), Crenshaw's
article would rank second, with 136 citations. Conversely, Catherine MacKinnon's 1991 article
Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991), has been more widely cited
in SSCI journals than in the law reviews covered by Shepard's. With 55 SSCI cites, MacKinnon's
article ties for fourth place on Shapiro's 1991 list. If the articles on that list were rearranged
according to their law review citation totals, MacKinnon's article would drop to ninth place (with
35 citations).
22. John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L.
REV. 1 (1989).
23. Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MicH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
24. The LEXIS MEGA library contains 186,258 judicial decisions issued in 1994, while the
LAWREV library includes only 7,012 law review articles published that year. Both of these
figures include sources that Shepard's does not track: the MEGA library contains unpublished
judicial opinions and orders, while the LAWREV library includes almost 100 more journals than
Shepard's. The raw numbers, however, indicate the magnitude of difference between the
number of law review articles and judicial opinions published each year.
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with "a camouflaging layer of detailed documentation"2 5 or "over-
whelming collections of minutiae" 26-penchants that have elicited
strong criticism.27 Courts, on the other hand, may cite law review arti-
cles less frequently than they cite other types of authority; several
studies have documented both this phenomenon and a recent decline
in the number of judicial citations to law reviews.28 The relatively low
citation totals earned by even the most-cited law review articles in
judicial opinions are consistent with these findings.
The fact that courts cite law review articles less frequently than
scholars cite those materials does not necessarily mean that academic
writing lacks influence in the courts. Judges and academic writers may
The average law review article probably is longer than the typical judicial opinion: we did
not attempt to compare the number of pages (and trees) devoured by judges and scholars each
year. Additional pages allow more opportunities for citation. This difference, however, is
closely related to the rhetorical differences between judicial opinions and law review articles
discussed in text.
25. W. Lawrence Church, A Plea for Readable Law Review Articles, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 739,
744.
26. Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103
HARV. L. REV. 926, 930 (1990).
27. See, e.g., Church, supra note 25; Lasson, supra note 26; Abner J. Mikva, Goodbye to
Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 647 (1985); John E. Nowak, Woe Unto You, Law Reviews!, 27
ARIz. L. REV. 317 (1985); Rodell, supra note 4. Law review writers, however, also have their
defenders. See Project, Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement A Survey of Attor-
neys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467, 1471-72 (1992) (collecting sources).
28. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and
Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 795, 812 (1981) (between 1960 and 1970, 97.1% of state supreme
court opinions cited at least one prior case, while only 12% cited any law review articles); Wil-
liam H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BolT. L.
REV. 121, 126, 140 (1995) (the New York Court of Appeals cited an average of 11.5 sources in
the text of each 1993 opinion, but only an average of .39 law review articles in the text of each
opinion; citation of law review articles declined from .57 in 1990 to .39 in 1993); Sirico & Margu-
lies, supra note 4, at 134 (the Supreme Court cited law reviews 963 times between 1971 and 1973,
but only 767 times from 1981 through 1983); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of
Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051-52 (1991) (only
ten percent of federal court of appeals opinions issued during 1989 cited a law review article;
more than half of those opinions contained just a single reference to a law review article); Bart
Sloan, Note, What Are We Writing For? Students Works as Authority and Their Citation by the
Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 230-31 (1992) (estimating that only be-
tween 0.74% and 1.25% of federal district court, court of appeals, or Supreme Court opinions
contain citations to student-authored law review works).
Any recent decline in judicial citations to law reviews, however, follows a massive increase
in those citations between 1900 and 1990. See, e.g., Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports":
Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940,
and 1978, 76 LAw LIaR. J. 1, 6 (1983) (Supreme Court opinions rendered during the 1900 Term
included only 1 citation to a legal periodical; by the 1940 Term, the number of citations to legal
periodicals rose to 35; by the 1978 Term, the number climbed to 343); Friedman, et al., supra, at
812 (percentage of state supreme court opinions citing law reviews rose from an average of 4%
between 1945 and 1955 to 12% for the decade 1960-1970); Manz, supra, at 139-40 (New York
Court of Appeals' citations to law reviews rose from an average of .15 cites per opinion in 1970
to .57 in 1990); Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42
DUKE L.J. 1, 38 n.150 (1992) (citation of law review articles in judicial opinions rose 59% be-
tween 1960 and 1985) (citing unpublished empirical work of Michael J. Saks).
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use citations for different purposes. Scholars consider themselves part
of an academic community in which dialogue with other researchers is
highly valued; frequent references to other works prove that a scholar
is engaged with the literature and help locate the new contribution
within that scholarship.29 Courts, on the other hand, are more likely
to use citations as rhetorical devices, employed only when the citation
itself adds persuasive authority to the court's opinion.30 In other
words, scholars may cite works they have barely read, while courts
may be influenced by articles they do not cite.31
Table 4 shows the distribution of judicial citations for each of our
most-cited articles among six categories of courts: military courts, fed-
eral bankruptcy courts, federal district courts, federal courts of ap-
peals, the United States Supreme Court, and state courts. State court
totals marked with an asterisk derive from the courts of a single state;
other "state" totals are spread among two or more states.
This table reveals that the articles most cited by judges achieve
citations among a variety of courts. Twenty-six of the thirty articles on
our lists recorded citations in more than one of our six judicial catego-
ries. Two-thirds of the articles earned citations in at least three cate-
gories, and one-third obtained citations in four different categories.
Contrary to some previous predictions, the majority of articles heavily
cited by judges qualify for their status by accumulating citations from
diverse courts-rather than generating large citation totals from a sin-
gle court.3
2
29. See, e.g., Herma H. Kay, In Defense of Footnotes, 32 ARiz. L. REV. 419, 426 (1990)
("The only thing that is important is who cites whom. If you're cited, that means you're identi-
fied as a player in the game: a scholar of significance.").
30. For a discussion of citations as rhetorical devices, see G.N. Gilbert. Referencing as Per-
suasion, 7 Soc. STUD. OF SCI. 113 (1977); see also Friedman, et al., supra note 28, at 814-17
(speculating that state supreme courts cite law review articles to buttress doctrinal changes, but
otherwise prefer case citations as more authoritative); Charles A. Johnson, Citations to Authority
in Supreme Court Opinions, 7 LAw & POL'Y 509, 510-11 (1985) (discussing the theory that courts
use citations to confer "legitimacy" on their decisions); Chester A. Newland, The Supreme Court
and Legal Writing: Learned Journals as Vehicles of an Anti-Antitrust Lobby?, 48 GEO. L.J. 105,
142 (1959) (concluding that Supreme Court Justices cited law reviews in antitrust cases "to sup-
port a view which [the Justice] had arrived at more or less independently of the reasoning in the
source referred to"); Sirico & Drew, supra note 28, at 1053 (claiming that judges may cite law
reviews rarely because they believe "that legal periodicals offer authority far inferior to that of
case law and therefore merit citation only rarely").
31. See Frank K. Richardson, Law Reviews and the Courts, 5 WHITTIER L. REV. 385, 388
(1983) (remarks of Justice Richardson of the Supreme Court of California).
32. On the other hand, four articles qualified for our list by obtaining citations exclusively
from state courts-and three of those received citations from the courts of a single state. An-
other article reaped most of its citations from federal bankruptcy courts, although it also ob-
tained one citation from a state court. We discuss these results further below. See infra notes 52-
57 and accompanying text.
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Table 4 underscores the importance of both state courts and the
federal courts of appeals in citing the most frequently referenced arti-
cles. State courts generated 252 (57%) of the citations gained by the
thirty articles on our lists, while the federal courts of appeals ac-
counted for another 105 (24%) of those citations. Together, these
sources accounted for more than four-fifths of the citations recorded
on our lists.
The United States Supreme Court, conversely, was relatively un-
important in selecting articles for the most-cited list. That Court
spawned only fourteen citations to articles on our lists-less than the
number of citations contributed by the federal bankruptcy courts. The
federal district courts also yielded relatively few citations, just over ten
percent of the citations on our list.
Much of this discrepancy stems from gross differences in the
number of opinions published within each judicial category. The
United States Supreme Court decides fewer than two hundred cases
by full opinion each year,33 while the federal courts of appeals publish
almost 7,000 opinions each year,34 and state courts generate well over
100,000 opinions each year.35 The most-cited law review articles ap-
pear in a higher proportion of Supreme Court opinions than court of
appeals opinions36-but still receive a smaller number of citations
from the Supreme Court.
These differences should not obscure the most dominant pattern
in table 4, that highly cited articles achieve citations across a spectrum
of courts. Separate lists of highly cited articles could be collected for
33. During the 1992 Term, the Court issued full opinions in 111 argued cases, and 4 per
curiam opinions. L. Ralph Mecham, ANN. REP. OF Tm DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF
U.S. COURTS, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, 1993, at App. I Table A-1 [hereinaf-
ter ANNUAL REPORT]. Supreme Court Justices also author dissents from denials of certiorari
and opinions denying or granting applications for stays. These opinions offer some additional
opportunities for citation of law review articles. Even with these additions, the number of cases
generating Supreme Court opinions is unlikely to exceed 300 each year.
34. Id. at Table S-3 (reporting 6,732 published opinions during the twelve months ending
September 30, 1993). The courts issued an additional 18,955 unpublished opinions during the
same year. Id. Almost 16,000 of those contained some statement of the court's reasoning, id.,
but Shepard's does not track those unpublished opinions so we have omitted them from our
analyses.
35. A LEXIS search of the COURTS file in the STATES library counted 113,427 state
opinions issued during 1994. Some of those LEXIS documents may be unpublished opinions,
and some may be simple orders rather than full opinions, but the number provides a rough
estimate of the number of citation opportunities in state court opinions each year.
36. According to the numbers reported supra notes 33-34 (and using the high estimate of
300 Supreme Court opinions offering opportunities for citation), articles from our lists appear in
4.67% of Supreme Court opinions, but only 1.56% of published court of appeals opinions.
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different courts; the majority of articles on our lists, however,
achieved citations from an impressive variety of judicial sources.
III. COMPARING THE MOST-CITED ARTICLES IN JUDICIAL
OPINIONS WITH THE MOST-CITED ARTICLES IN
SCHOLARLY JOURNALS
Our three "most cited" lists are analogous to the lists Shapiro
developed for the 1989-1991 law review articles most cited in scholarly
journals. To facilitate comparison of the two sets of lists, tables 5-7
reproduce Shapiro's 1989-1991 lists. These tables include the number
of SSCI citations reported by Shapiro, the number of law review cita-
tions documented by Shepard's, and the number of judicial citations
counted by Shepard's. Articles appearing on both our lists and Sha-
piro's lists are printed in boldface in tables 1-7.
The composition of these lists differs dramatically. Only five of
the thirty articles on our three lists also appear on Shapiro's lists.
Some of the most-cited articles in scholarly journals, moreover, re-
ceive very few citations in the courts. Twelve of the thirty-one articles
on Shapiro's three lists never have been cited in a judicial opinion,
although each of these articles has garnered over fifty scholarly cita-
tions-and some have attained well over one hundred citations in
other articles. More than two-thirds of the articles most cited in schol-
arly journals have received no more than a single judicial citation.
Conversely, two of the articles most frequently cited by courts
have received no scholarly citations. One of these is a student note on
DNA Profiling,37 the other is an article on Worker's Compensation.
38
Eleven of the most-cited articles in judicial opinions (more than one-
third of the total) have received fewer than ten scholarly citations, and
eighteen (almost two-thirds of the total) have accumulated fewer than
twenty references in other articles. Given the large number of schol-
arly citations to the most-cited articles on Shapiro's lists, these are sur-
prisingly low totals.
Some of these differences may reflect the recent vintage of the
articles we studied. The differences between the two 1989 lists appear
smaller than the differences between the 1990 or 1991 lists. Three of
the 1989 articles most cited by courts also appear on Shapiro's most-
cited list for that year. Only one of the articles on Shapiro's 1989 list
37. Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence
Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REv. 465 (1990).
38. H. Alston Johnson, Worker's Compensation, 50 LA. L. REV. 391 (1989).
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lacked any judicial citations, and half of his 1989 articles had achieved
more than one court citation by 1995. 39 It is possible that some law
review articles, especially those addressing novel issues or presenting
new theoretical frameworks, first find favor with other academics and
later influence judicial opinions.
We found some support for this hypothesis when we tested arti-
cles excluded from Shepard's for judicial citations. 40 R.H. Coase's
leading 1960 article on The Problem of Social Cost did not gather any
judicial citations for the first eight years after its publication, although
it gained forty-three scholarly citations in journals indexed by SSCI
during that period.41 The article earned just one judicial citation dur-
ing the 1960s, and only five more judicial citations during the 1970s (a
total of just six judicial citations over two decades), but was cited in at
least 630 scholarly articles during the same twenty years. Coase's
work finally achieved judicial popularity during the 1980s, winning
twenty judicial citations during that decade. Several other prominent
articles enjoyed similarly delayed recognition in the courts.42
If these judicial citation patterns are common among articles fre-
quently cited in scholarly journals, then differences between articles of
the same vintage that are most cited by judges and scholars would
39. In contrast, five of the articles on Shapiro's 1990 list lacked any court citations, and only
three of those articles had achieved more than a single judicial citation. Six of the articles on
Shapiro's 1991 list lacked any judicial citations, and only one of those articles had been cited by
more than one court.
40. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
41. Shepard's does not index the Journal of Law and Economics, so it is impossible to trace
references to Coase's work through that source.
42. Alexander Meiklejohn's 1961 article, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup.
Cr. REV. 245, received no judicial citations during its first five years; six judicial citations during
the next five years; and nine judicial citations during the following five years. The article was
more heavily cited among academics from its initial publication, gaining at least 17 citations in
scholarly journals during the first five years after publication; 42 additional citations during the
next five years; and another 77 academic citations during the following five years. Harry Kalven,
Jr.'s 1964 article, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment, " 1964 Sup. C. REV. 191, followed a similar pattern: 4 judicial citations during the
first five years; 12 citations during the next five years; and 10 citations during the next five years.
By contrast, the article received 71 citations in academic journals during the first five years after
publication. The citation totals for both Meiklejohn and Kalven in academic journals probably
underestimate their total number of citations, because the figures are based on SSCI, which
indexes a relatively small number of law reviews. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See also Manz, supra note 28, at 141 ("[O]lIder articles are cited in considerable numbers" in
opinions of the New York Court of Appeals. "Almost one-fifth of the works cited in [1991-19931
was [sic] over twenty-five years-old."); Sirico & Drew, supra note 28, at 1055-56, 1056 n.23 (52%
of citations to law reviews in U.S. court of appeals opinions were to articles published more than
five years previously; 29% of those citations were to articles more than 10 years old); Sloan,
supra note 28, at 238-39 (one-third of judicial citations to student works were to works that were




decline over time. The data analyzed here comprise too small a popu-
lation to test this theory, but it is an intriguing possibility for future
exploration.
Even accounting for the possibility that popular, scholarly articles
elicit judicial citations after a time lag, the difference between our lists
and Shapiro's lists is striking. The two sets of lists show little overlap,
and a majority of the articles on each list received few citations in the
other category. The recent articles most cited by the courts are quite
different from the articles most cited in scholarly journals. We explore
this divergence further by examining a number of other differences
between the two sets of most-cited articles. These differences include
the subject matter of the articles, the theoretical perspectives they em-
ploy, the journals in which they appeared, and some characteristics of
their authors.
A. Subjects
Shapiro does not analyze the articles on his most-cited lists by
subject matter, although he notes that constitutional law articles are
more likely than articles in some other fields to reap large numbers of
scholarly citations. 43 A glance at the titles appearing on Shapiro's
1989-1991 lists suggests that at least half of those articles concern race
or sex discrimination. Other notable clusters of three or more articles
discuss issues related to higher education, statutory interpretation,
constitutional law, storytelling as scholarship, and corporate finance
or control.
The articles on our "most cited" lists share an interest in statutory
interpretation. At least six of our articles outline general theories of
statutory interpretation, including three of the five articles that over-
lap with Shapiro's lists.44 The congruence of most-cited articles in this
field supports Judge Posner's observation that "statutory interpreta-
tion is an area where the innovations come mainly from the acad-
43. Shapiro, Revisited, supra note 1, at 762.
44. Our categorization of articles necessarily is somewhat rough; some articles discuss a
wide variety of topics. The three statutory interpretation articles appearing on both sets of lists
are: William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning,
42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CMi. L.
REV. 1175 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405 (1989). Other articles on our lists that discuss general theories of statutory interpreta-
tion are: William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991). Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law and Pol-
icy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chev-
ron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Chevron].
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emy. '' 45 The heavy concentration of most-cited articles on statutory
interpretation also may reflect the Supreme Court's recent attention
to the field and an explosion of recent academic writing on the
subject.
46
Constitutional law also surfaces in our lists and accounts for the
other two articles appearing on both our lists and Shapiro's lists.
47
The breadth of the constitutional field, however, somewhat diminishes
the importance of this overlap. Indeed, apart from the two articles
common to both lists, the constitutional law articles on our lists ap-
pear to address quite different topics than the ones on Shapiro's
rosters.48
Storytelling did not generate any heavily cited articles in the
courts, and corporate law entered our lists only as an adjunct to a
study of settlements. 49 Most surprising, only one article on our lists
explicitly addresses sex or race discrimination, and even that article
does not focus exclusively on those issues.50 The failure of recent arti-
cles analyzing sex or race discrimination to generate substantial judi-
45. Richard A. Posner, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of
Public Policy, 74 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1568 (1988) (book review).
46. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEG-
ISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988) (summarizing recent devel-
opments in both courts and academic writing).
47. The two articles appearing on both sets of lists are: Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as
a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). Other constitutional articles heavily cited by the courts were
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and
the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989); Harold H. Bruff, Separation of Powers
Under the Texas Constitution, 68 TEx. L. REV. 1337 (1990); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J.
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731
(1991); Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical Diag-
nosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1989) (including discussion of confrontation clause
issues).
48. Excluding the articles appearing on both sets of lists, the constitutional law articles on
our lists discussed jury issues in criminal cases, the retroactivity of new constitutional rules, con-
frontation clause issues, and the separation of powers. The constitutional articles on Shapiro's
lists (again excluding the two common articles) focus on sex or race discrimination, the right of
privacy, and first amendment issues.
49. Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991). This article focuses on the conditions producing settle-
ments and critiques general theories of settlement, rather than focusing on substantive issues in
securities litigation.
The failure of courts to cite more heavily to articles analyzing corporate issues may reflect
the fact that courts, by necessity, address only issues subject to litigation. Some academic analy-
ses of corporate law may influence transactional lawyers or policymakers, but may not relate to
litigated cases. See Project, supra note 27, at 1500 (survey of judges, practicing attorneys, and
law professors revealed that practicing attorneys were more interested than judges or professors
in articles on corporate law).
50. Albert Alschuler's 1989 article on The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremp-
tory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, supra note 47, discusses the problem of race-
based peremptory jury challenges at length, but also addresses several other jury-related issues.
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cial citations is surprising; the courts surely have continued to grapple
with issues of discrimination since 1989. This lacuna may reflect the
failure of courts to cite any scholarly analyses in this field: alterna-
tively, it could signal the presence of a large number of cited articles in
the area, no one of which has gathered enough citations to penetrate
the most-cited list.
Three other subjects-civil procedure, evidence, and criminal
law-dominate our lists of the 1989-1991 articles most cited by the
courts. Each of these categories accounts for about one-sixth of the
articles on our lists, so that the three categories together account for
half of the articles on our lists.51 Within these broad categories, arti-
cles dealing with sentencing guidelines, DNA testing, summary judg-
ments, settlements, and the admissibility of evidence in cases of child
sexual abuse attracted particular judicial attention. The first two top-
ics each generated three articles heavily cited by the courts, while the
remaining three categories yielded two such articles apiece.
Neither these specific topics nor the general categories of civil
procedure, evidence, and criminal law appear on Shapiro's 1989-1991
lists. Nor do these subjects figure prominently on his lists of articles
published in other recent years-although a few articles related to
civil procedure emerge during the earlier part of the decade he
studied. With the exception of statutory interpretation and constitu-
tional law, the subjects addressed in articles heavily cited by the courts
51. Articles analyzing civil procedure topics included: Alexander, supra note 49" Jill E.
Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement
and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589 (1991); W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Appellate Review in
Civil Appeals, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 865 (1990); David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, Summary Judg-
ments in Texas, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 243 (1989); Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Sec-
ond Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990); William Powers. Jr. & Jack
Ratliff, Another Look at "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence," 69 TEX. L. REV. 515 (1991).
Articles focusing on evidentiary issues included: Hoeffel, supra note 37; Edward J. lm-
winkelried, The Debate in the DNA Cases Over the Foundation for the Admission of Scientific
Evidence: The Importance of Human Error as a Cause of Forensic Misanalysis, 69 WASH. U.
L.Q. 19 (1991); Mosteller, supra note 47; Myers et al., supra note 22; William C. Thompson &
Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA.
L. REV. 45 (1989).
Articles discussing criminal law matters included: Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sen-
tencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991); Alschuler, supra
note 47; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 47; Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination
of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1 (1991); William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495 (1990). Most of the articles discussing
evidentiary topics also bear particular relevance to criminal cases.
The dominance of criminal law and evidence articles on our lists is consistent with a recent
survey finding that judges want law reviews to publish more articles on these topics. See Project,
supra note 27, at 1500-01.
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diverge sharply from the topics confronted in articles most cited by
academics.
It is noteworthy, finally, that five of the thirty articles on our lists
focus on the law of a single state.5 2 None of the articles most cited in
scholarly journals concentrate on the law of a particular state. The
five state-law articles on our lists derived almost all of their citations
from the courts of a single state;53 in that way, they differed from most
other articles on our lists, which gathered cites from a diverse number
of courts.
54
In his initial study, Shapiro expressed concern that articles of this
nature would distort any list of most-cited articles in the courts. 55 The
potential distorting effect of articles focusing on the law of a single
state, however, is no greater than potential distortions stemming from
the increasing percentage of criminal cases in the federal courts
(which might enhance citation of articles analyzing criminal law) or
the specialized workload of bankruptcy courts (which would favor ar-
ticles on bankruptcy law). 56 Citations in judicial opinions necessarily
reflect the workload of the judges who author those opinions. If the
courts of a particular state repeatedly cite a scholarly article, then the
52. Bruff, supra note 47 (Texas law); Hall, supra note 51 (same); Hittner & Liberato, supra
note 51 (same); Johnson, supra note 38 (Louisiana law); Powers & Ratliff, supra note 51 (Texas
law). Bruff's article focuses on Texas law, but also draws some analogies to federal separation-
of-powers principles. Similarly, Hittner and Liberato briefly discuss summary judgment practice
in the federal courts, contrasting that practice with Texas procedures.
53. Hittner and Liberato's article on summary judgments in Texas has been cited in a single
Oklahoma decision, as well as in fifteen Texas opinions. Johnson's article on workers' compen-
sation in Louisiana has been cited in three federal diversity cases, as well as in nine Louisiana
opinions. The other three articles, all focusing on issues of Texas law, have been cited exclusively
by Texas courts.
54. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
55. Shapiro, Most-Cited, supra note 5, at 1545 n.27 (counts of judicial citations "would tend
to spotlight articles of parochial importance that repeatedly are cited by the courts of a particular
state"). In support of this point, Shapiro noted a 1960 article from the Texas Law Review that
had garnered 547 citations from Texas courts. Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insuffi-
cient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TEx. L. REv. 361 (1960). The distinction between these two
points of error under Texas law continues to excite a considerable number of judicial citations.
One of the articles on our 1991 list discusses the same issue and builds upon Calvert's apparently
classic (at least in Texas) article. Powers & Ratliff, supra note 51.
56. One of the articles on our 1989 most-cited list analyzes an issue of bankruptcy law and
has been cited almost exclusively by the federal bankruptcy courts. Jay L. Westbrook, A Func-
tional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MiN.. L. REv. 227 (1989) (14 citations in bankruptcy
opinions; 1 citation in a state court opinion).
Indeed, most articles focusing on the law of a particular state suffer a disadvantage in amas-
sing large citation counts. The federal courts of appeals issue almost 7,000 published opinions
each year, providing numerous opportunities for judicial citations to articles on federal law. See
supra note 34. Few states publish as many appellate opinions in a single year. A LEXIS search
revealed that Texas, one of the largest states, releases only about 3,500 appellate opinions each
year. Smaller states probably publish even fewer opinions each year.
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article probably touches upon issues frequently litigated in that state
and offers information that the courts find useful. The presence of
articles on our lists that focus on the law of a particular state is not in
itself problematic; state courts decide the vast majority of cases in our
country.
Of somewhat greater concern is the fact that four of the five
state-law articles appearing on our lists, as well as the article that
prompted Shapiro's observation, discuss principles of Texas law. This
"Texas phenomenon" suggests either that Texas courts cite law review
articles more often than do courts in other states, or that they at least
cite particular articles repeatedly.57 This phenomenon bears further
investigation, because it may shed light on citation patterns among
state courts. The presence of these articles, however, confirms that
state courts constitute an important audience for scholarly articles.
B. Theoretical Perspectives
Shapiro notes that many of the recent articles most cited in schol-
arly journals analyze legal issues from a feminist, critical race theory,
or critical legal studies perspective. He estimates that two-thirds of
the most-cited articles published in 1990 or 1991 adopt one of these
"outsider" perspectives. 58 In clear contrast, none of the articles on
our 1989-1991 lists adopts an explicitly feminist, critical race, or criti-
cal legal studies perspective.
Shapiro also notes heavy representation of articles drawing upon
economic theory in his most-cited lists, although the dominance of
these articles is greater on his "all-time" list than on his lists for more
recent years.59 Our lists of the 1989-1991 articles most cited by the
courts show moderate attention to economic principles. Two of the
thirty articles on our lists explicitly engage in economic analysis, 60 one
draws upon the related field of game theory,61 one includes discussion
of basic economic concepts,62 and two devote at least some attention
57. The heavy representation of Texas articles on our lists may result partly from the fact
that, because Texas is a populous state, its judicial system publishes more opinions than do the
courts of other states. It is noteworthy, however, that the courts of other populous states (such
as New York and California) have not generated articles for our "most cited" lists.
58. Shapiro, Revisited, supra note 1, at 758.
59. Id. at 759.
60. Fisch, supra note 51; Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 51.
61. Eskridge, supra note 44.
62. Westbrook, supra note 56. It is hard to discuss any issue of commercial law intelligently
without drawing upon some economic principles. Westbrook's article exemplifies the difficulty
in determining when a commercial law article becomes a "law and economics" article.
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to critiquing economic models.63 Economic principles plainly influ-
enced the recent articles most heavily cited by the courts.64
The representation of economic analysis, but not critical perspec-
tives, among the recent articles most frequently cited by the courts is
consistent with the hypothesis that new academic perspectives require
time to win high citation rates in the courts. Coase's landmark eco-
nomic critique of Social Costs waited almost twenty years before elic-
iting a substantial number of judicial citations. 65 Richard Posner's
Theory of Negligence66 earned only three judicial citations during its
first fifteen years, then acquired ten additional citations during its next
seven years. 67 Feminist and critical race perspectives represent more
recent phenomena than the application of economic principles to legal
analysis; a time lag in judicial citations may partly explain the absence
of these perspectives from our lists of the articles most cited by courts.
On the other hand, the nature of feminist and critical race per-
spectives may prevent those articles from ever achieving substantial
citation rates in the courts. These perspectives pose fundamental chal-
lenges to the fairness of legal rules. To do their work, judges must
accept many premises of the legal system and attempt to resolve con-
troversies within the bounds of that system. Critical challenges to ba-
sic legal assumptions may win favor with academics and
policymakers-and may even eventually alter basic assumptions of
the legal system-but they are harder to incorporate into individual
judicial decisions.
Two other scholarly perspectives appear among the articles on
our "most cited" lists: two of these articles report the results of origi-
nal empirical studies, 68 and three others include detailed digests of
medical or psychological literature helpful in resolving particular legal
issues.69 Shapiro does not discuss the extent to which the articles most
cited in scholarly journals share these traits. The high citation rates to
63. Alexander, supra note 49; Sullivan, supra note 47.
64. See also Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluation of Economic
Analysis in Contract Law, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 73, 98 (concluding, based on an empirical
study, that "'law and economics' has gained a modest degree of recognition by the courts").
65. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
66. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29 (1972).
67. Skeptics might suspect that some of these most recent citations appear in Judge Posner's
own opinions for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. None of the citations, however, appear
in opinions of that court. Most of the citations to Posner's article appear in state court opinions.
See also Harrison, supra note 64, at 99 (noting that it will take time for the law and economics
movement to affect judicial decisions).
68. Alexander, supra note 49; Eskridge, supra note 44.
69. Hoeffel, supra note 37; Myers et al., supra note 22; Thompson & Ford, supra note 51.
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these five articles on our lists, however, suggest that legal scholars-or
interdisciplinary teams of legal academics and specialists from other
disciplines-can play an important role in both providing courts with
empirical information about the impact of legal rules and articulating
the legal significance of important findings from other disciplines. 70
Apart from these particular perspectives, it is noteworthy that
many of the articles frequently cited by courts are highly theoretical.
In addition to the economic analyses noted above, William Eskridge
and Philip Frickey draw upon Aristotle's theory of practical reasoning
to propose a theory of statutory interpretation;71 Cass Sunstein in-
cludes extensive theoretical discussion of the proper relationship be-
tween law and administration in his highly cited article about statutory
interpretation after Chevron;72 Kathleen Sullivan invokes a variety of
philosophical and economic theories to critique unconstitutional con-
ditions;73 Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer summon jurisprudential
theory to analyze the problem of retroactivity across a broad spectrum
of constitutional cases; 74 and Akhil Amar proposes unifying theories
for treating the Bill of Rights as a whole.75 These and other articles
on our lists demonstrate that courts do not eschew theoretical discus-
sions by scholars, as long as they perceive those discussions as helpful
in resolving the controversies before them.
C. Law Reviews
Shapiro's most-cited articles are concentrated among relatively
few journals. The 103 most-cited articles of the decade 1982-1991 ap-
pear in just twenty-one law reviews, with the top three journals
(Harvard, Yale, and Stanford) accounting for more than half of those
most-cited articles. 76 As Table 8 shows, the same pattern holds for the
most recent three years of that decade. The thirty-one articles from
Shapiro's 1989-1991 lists appear in fourteen different law reviews, and
the top three reviews (Harvard, Michigan, and Yale) again account for
more than half of the most-cited articles during those years. Just six
70. Several other commentators have suggested that law review articles may fulfill these
functions for courts. See, e.g., Nard, supra note 4; Richardson, supra note 31, at 389 (comments
by California Supreme Court Justice); Sloan, supra note 28, at 226. See generally Schuck, supra
note 4 (encouraging law professors to engage in more empirical research).
71. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 44.
72. Sunstein, Chevron, supra note 44.
73. Sullivan, supra note .47.
74. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 47.
75. Amar, supra note 47.
76. Shapiro, Revisited, supra note 1, at 763.
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reviews (the previous three plus Stanford, Columbia, and Duke) pub-
lished well over two-thirds of the most-cited articles on Shapiro's
1989-1991 lists.
The most-cited articles in judicial opinions also show some con-
centration in elite journals, but the concentration appears not as
strong. Eighteen different journals published the thirty articles on our
1989-1991 lists (see Table 9). Five journals (rather than three) are
necessary to account for half of the most-cited articles on our lists, and
eight reviews (rather than six) are needed to account for two-thirds of
the articles most cited by courts.77
These differences, and the underlying database, are too small to
do more than suggest a possible trend. It is clear that a few prestigi-
ous journals published a disproportionate number of the recent arti-
cles most cited by both scholarly journals and court opinions.
Confirmation of whether the concentration is greater for articles most
heavily cited by academics, as appears from this preliminary investiga-
tion, must await further work.
A more striking difference between the two lists of journals pub-
lishing most-cited articles emerges if we examine the journals that
round out both lists. On Shapiro's 1989-1991 lists, the most-cited arti-
cles all appear in journals published by law schools commonly ranked
among the top twenty-five schools nationwide.78 The most-cited arti-
cles in judicial opinions, on the other hand, come from journals pub-
lished by a wide array of law schools-including such regional schools
as Louisiana State, Nebraska, South Carolina, and St. Mary's.
77. In contrast, a study of citations to all law review articles published during the 1978-79
academic year found that citations in both courts and journals were almost identically concen-
trated in the most elite journals. Articles in 23 journals generated about 50% of the law review
citations in both courts and journals, while articles in 54 journals accounted for about 75% of the
citations in both sources. Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Jour-
nals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400, 406 (1986).
78. Ranking law schools is a hazardous business. The fourteen schools publishing the jour-
nals in Table 8, however, all appear among the top twenty-five law schools in the following
rankings: The Top 25 Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 20, 1995, at 84; Richard H.
Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculties,
137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 537, 549 n.65 (1988) (listing twenty-two "high prestige" law schools); Deborah
J. Merritt, et al., Family, Place, and Career: The Gender Paradox in Law School Hiring, 1993
Wis. L. REv. 395, 409-10 n.53 (1993) (ranking schools on a scale combining median LSAT of
entering students with academic reputation rank as reported by U.S. News and World Report).
Shapiro's other most-cited lists demonstrate the same concentration of articles among jour-
nals published by the top 25 law schools. In fact, only five of more than two hundred law review




Using a prestige scale that one of us developed in connection with
previous work,79 we assigned a prestige rating to the schools publish-
ing each of the journals in which articles from our "most cited" lists
appeared and compared those ratings with similar ratings for the arti-
cles appearing on Shapiro's 1989-1991 lists. The mean institutional
prestige rating for the journals publishing the thirty articles on our
most-cited lists was 2.61 on a 9-point scale that ranges from a low of -
4.81 to a high of 4.03. The mean prestige rating for journals publishing
articles on Shapiro's 1989-1991 lists was significantly higher: 3.57 on
the same 9-point scale.80
In other words, judges resemble academic authors in drawing
their most heavily cited articles disproportionately from a few elite
journals. Judges, on the other hand, appear more willing to reach be-
yond the most prestigious journals in citing certain articles repeat-
edly.81 The articles most cited by scholars overwhelmingly appear in
journals published by law schools with very high prestige ratings,
while the articles most cited by judges appear in journals published by
a more diverse group of schools.
D. Authors
Shapiro devotes no attention to the professional status of the au-
thors on his lists, perhaps because these authors are almost exclusively
law professors. Shapiro's 1989-1991 lists include one article authored
by a Supreme Court Justice, one written by an attorney, and one
coauthored by a professor at the University of Chicago's School of
Business.82 Twenty-nine of the thirty-one articles appearing on Sha-
79. See Merritt, supra note 78, at 409-10. This scale combines the median LSAT of first-
year students enrolled at each law school with the academic reputation rank (as reported by U.S.
News and World Report) for each school.
80. Social scientists use tests of statistical significance to gauge the likelihood that results
observed in their data (such as the difference in means we report above) reflect real patterns in
the underlying population rather than stem from some chance process (such as random error in
sampling, measurement, or coding). The theory of statistical inference allows social scientists to
decide on the level of risk they are willing to take in making an incorrect inference from their
data to the underlying universe. By convention, social scientists treat relationships that have a
probability of resulting from chance that is five percent or less as "statistically significant." Re-
sults that are significant at smaller levels are even less likely to be the product of chance. See
generally HUBERT M. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 115 (2d ed. 1979). The difference in means
reported above is significant at the .004 level, meaning that there are only four chances in one
thousand that the difference resulted from random processes.
81. See also Manz, supra note 28, at 141 (noting "diversification" of citations to law reviews
by New York Court of Appeals).
82. We determined professional status at the time an article was published. It is notewor-
thy, however, that the Justice appearing on Shapiro's most-cited lists (Antonin Scalia) taught for
many years at the University of Chicago School of Law, while the practicing attorney (Jed
Rubenfeld) joined Yale Law School's faculty the year after publishing the article that appears on
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piro's lists were written or coauthored by a law school professor;
twenty-eight were produced exclusively by law professors.
Our lists, in contrast, include five articles written or coauthored
by judges; two written by law students; six authored or coauthored by
practicing attorneys; three written or coauthored by professors from
disciplines other than law; and one that includes as coauthors two phy-
sicians without academic appointment. 83 Only nineteen of the thirty
articles on our lists include at least one law professor as an author; just
seventeen bear the exclusive mark of law professors as authors. Over-
all, law professors contributed to less than two-thirds of the 1989-1991
articles most cited by the courts. 84
The willingness of courts to cite repeatedly to articles authored by
nonacademics-including other judges, practicing attorneys, and stu-
dents-while academic authors reserve their most frequent citations
for other law professors, is noteworthy. It would be useful to know
whether this pattern is longstanding or has only emerged during re-
cent years. If the pattern is new, it may signal a decline in the respon-
siveness of legal academics to the needs of judges-so that the courts
now draw increasingly upon the work of nonacademics. On the other
hand, further research might reveal that this pattern is longstanding.
Judges always may have been more willing than academics to draw
heavily upon the work of insightful students, practicing attorneys, and
other judges.85
Shapiro's list. Both of these authors, therefore, may have possessed an academic aura for the
other academics who cited them.
It is not clear whether Shapiro included student-authored works in his study. The most
recent supplements to Shepard's Law Review Citations include student works, and SSCI also
tracks citations to at least some student work, but Shapiro does not indicate whether he included
those in his search. If Shapiro systematically excluded student works, that could explain the
absence of student authors from his most-cited lists. On the other hand, it appears unlikely that
any student work would have obtained the number of citations necessary to win inclusion on any
of Shapiro's recent lists.
83. Once again, we determined professional status at the time an article was published.
Some articles fell into more than one of the categories mentioned in the text-for example, three
articles were coauthored by judges and practicing attorneys. For other evidence of recent judi-
cial citations to law review articles authored outside law faculties, see Sirico & Drew, supra note
28, at 1054 (sample of federal court of appeal opinions published during 1989 showed 52 cita-
tions to law review articles written by students and 169 citations to articles written by faculty or
other professionals).
84. The difference between the percentage of articles authored by law professors on our
lists and that percentage on Shapiro's lists for the same three years is statistically significant (a <
.004). See supra note 80 (discussing tests of statistical significance).
85. One study of United States Supreme Court opinions from the 1965 Term found that
student works constituted more than one quarter of the Court's references to secondary sources
in majority opinions. Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material
1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55, 66 (1968); see also Roger C. Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Insti-
tution": The American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 4 (1986) (it is "acceptable [for a
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The authors appearing on our "most cited" lists differed in a sec-
ond important way from the writers on Shapiro's lists: the recent arti-
cles most cited by the courts were more likely to be coauthored than
the recent articles most frequently cited by academics. Only three of
the thirty-one articles on Shapiro's 1989-1991 lists (10%) are
coauthored, and none includes more than two authors. Twelve of the
thirty articles on our lists (40%) were coauthored; two included more
than two authors. 86
The reason for this phenomenon is not clear. It may stem partly
from the tendency of courts to cite empirical or interdisciplinary work,
which often requires collaboration. Three of the five articles from our
lists that report empirical results or distill information from other dis-
ciplines were coauthored.87 The high rate of coauthorship on our lists
also may derive from the fact that attorneys, judges, and nonlaw aca-
demics are more likely to coauthor articles than are law professors.
Three of the five articles on our lists that included judicial authors
were coauthored, as were four of the six articles listing attorneys as
authors and all three of the articles including academic authors from
other fields. Even among the seventeen articles on our lists exclu-
sively authored by law professors, however, the incidence of coauthor-
ship (four) is twice as high as that incidence on Shapiro's lists. Further
work is needed both to determine if this pattern holds in a larger pop-
ulation of most-cited articles and to identify possible causes for the
pattern.
The authors on our "most cited" lists also obtained their law de-
grees from a somewhat different group of schools than did the authors
on Shapiro's lists.88 As Shapiro notes, the authors on his lists earned
court] to cite and even to discuss student notes"). Naomi Sheiner, a student at Fordham Law
School during the 1970's, authored a particularly influential student comment. Naomi Sheiner,
Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978).
Courts have characterized that student piece as the "wellspring" of the market share liability
theory debated in tort cases during the last fifteen years. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 607 P.2d 924, 943 (Cal. 1980) (Richardson, J., dissenting). See generally Sloan, supra note
28, at 227 n.38; Richardson, supra note 31, at 388-89.
86. The difference between the percentage of coauthored articles on our lists and that per-
centage on Shapiro's 1989-91 lists is statistically significant (a < .006). See supra note 80 (discuss-
ing tests of statistical significance).
We count the student-authored project, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term: Leading Cases, 105
HARV. L. REV. 177 (1991), as a coauthored work. Even without this project, composed by many
different students, the number of coauthored articles on our lists appears quite high.
87. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
88. We focus only on the initial law degree (J.D. or LL.B.) earned by any author. It is not
clear whether Shapiro considered advanced degrees, such as the LL.M., for his authors. The
mention of only one degree for each author on his lists, however, suggests that he too counted
only initial law degrees.
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their law degrees from a remarkably concentrated group of schools.
Just three schools (Harvard, Yale, and the University of Chicago)
trained over seventy percent of the authors generating the articles
most cited by other academics. 89 The thirty-three authors appearing
on Shapiro's 1989-1991 lists received their law degrees from just eight
different schools (see Table 10). Three of those schools (Yale,
Harvard, and Berkeley) accounted for twenty-six (79%) of the
degrees.
In contrast, the thirty-nine law graduates who authored articles
appearing on our lists graduated from seventeen different law schools
(see Table 11). The list shows some concentration of elite degrees:
Harvard awarded degrees to thirteen of the authors on our lists, while
Yale graduated eight of the authors, for a combined total of fifty-four
percent. The concentration, however, appears less strong than on
Shapiro's lists. Overall, moreover, our authors graduated from signifi-
cantly less prestigious law schools than did Shapiro's authors. Using
the same institutional prestige scale described above, 90 the authors of
articles most cited by the courts graduated from schools with a mean
rating of 2.81, while the authors of articles most cited by academics
graduated from schools with a mean rating of 3.52.91
Given this difference in the prestige of law degrees earned by the
two sets of authors, we also might expect the law professors on Sha-
piro's lists to teach at more prestigious schools than the professors on
our lists. Here, however, no notable difference emerged between the
two groups of authors. At least two-thirds of the law-professor au-
thors on both sets of lists were affiliated with schools commonly
ranked among the top twenty-five schools (see Tables 12-13).92 Both
lists, however, also included authors affiliated with less prestigious
schools-including Hawaii, Rutgers, and American (on Shapiro's
lists), and Brooklyn, Davis, Fordham, and McGeorge (on our lists).
The law-professor authors on our lists taught at schools with a mean
prestige rating of 2.99, while Shapiro's law-professor authors taught at
schools with a mean rating of 2.76.93 This small difference was not
statistically significant.
89. Shapiro, Revisited, supra note 1, at 765.
90. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
91. This difference is statistically significant at the .05 level. See supra note 80.
92. We identified academic affiliation, as Shapiro did, at the time an article was published.




We did, however, detect one other difference between the law-
professor authors on our list and those on Shapiro's lists.94 Eight of
the nineteen articles on our lists (42%) that were authored by at least
one law professor included at least one author holding a named pro-
fessorship or chair at a law school. Only three of the twenty-nine "law
professor" articles on Shapiro's lists (10%) included an author with a
named professorship or chair.95
This pattern, like many of the others we have detected, must be
confirmed through exploration of a larger database. As a preliminary
matter, however, the difference suggests that courts are more likely to
cite frequently to articles authored by senior, academically distin-
guished professors, while academic authors are somewhat more will-
ing to cite frequently to articles written by more junior scholars.96
If this difference exists, it could reflect a number of dynamics.
Courts may be more status conscious in their citations, seeking to in-
voke the most senior academic names to support their points.97 This
explanation would be consistent with judges' apparent preference for
citing the work of other judges. On the other hand, the status expla-
nation appears inconsistent with the greater willingness of judges to
cite articles produced by students and practicing attorneys, as well as
with their willingness to cite articles from less prestigious journals.
Alternatively, the possible preference of judges for the work of
chaired professors could reflect the shifting focus of academic scholar-
ship identified by some critics. Professors holding chairs or named
professorships tend to be more senior than their colleagues; heavy ju-
dicial citation to the work of these scholars may reflect a sense that
the work of senior scholars is more relevant to judicial decisionmaking
than the work of more junior scholars. Conversely, if academic writ-
ers are shifting their attention to new, less doctrinal topics-as some
critics have maintained-then relatively junior professors engaged in
94. See also infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text (discussing differences in the sex and
race composition of all authors on both lists).
95. This difference is statistically significant at the .01 level. See supra note 80.
96. We also detected a small difference in the likelihood of judges and academics to cite
repeatedly to the work of assistant or associate professors. 5 of the 19 "law professor" articles
on our lists (26%) were authored or coauthored by an assistant or associate professor of law. In
contrast, 12 of the 29 law professor articles on Shapiro's list (41%) were authored or coauthored
by assistant or associate professors of law. This difference is not quite as dramatic as the differ-
ence we identified in authorship by chaired professors, and it does not reach statistical signifi-
cance in this small population (a=.29), but it suggests a distinction in citation patterns that could
be explored in further research.
97. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (arguing that courts may use citations largely
for their rhetorical force).
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newer forms of scholarship would debut more easily on lists of the
most-cited articles in scholarly journals.
All of these points merit further empirical investigation. Our pre-
liminary comparison of most-cited articles in three recent years, how-
ever, suggests that judges are more likely than academics to cite
heavily to work produced outside the legal academy; to reference
coauthored articles; and to draw their most-cited articles from gradu-
ates of less prestigious law schools. Our study also intimates that,
when judges do cite the work of law professors, they are more likely
than academics to cite heavily the recent works of chaired professors.
On the other hand, our investigation suggests that both judges and
academics favor articles authored by law professors affiliated with
prestigious institutions.
E. Outsiders
Shapiro notes the extraordinary emergence of women and minor-
ity scholars on his most recent lists of heavily cited articles; this finding
may constitute the most striking result of his study. Women wrote 29
of the 103 articles appearing on Shapiro's 1982-1991 lists, while schol-
ars of minority races authored 19 of those articles. Altogether, wo-
men or minority scholars published more than one-third (39 out of
103) of the 1982-1991 articles most cited by other scholars. 98 The
trend is even more apparent on Shapiro's 1989-1991 lists. Women or
minority scholars authored almost two-thirds (19 out of 31) of the arti-
cles appearing on those three lists.
We were unable to gather sufficient information about the race of
our authors to compare the percentage of minority authors on our lists
with the high percentage identified by Shapiro.99 We were, however,
able to identify the author's sex for twenty-nine of the thirty articles
98. Shapiro, Revisited, supra note 1, at 758.
99. For authors holding full-time law school positions, we were able to check minority status
on the self-reported list of "Minority Law Teachers" in the AALS Directory of Law Teachers.
See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW ScHooLs, Ti AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS,
1994-95, at 1241. Two of the 23 professors authoring articles on our lists (9%) appear on that
AALS list, a percentage that compares favorably to the percentage of minority law professors
teaching in 1990. See Edward A. Adams, Students See Bias on Law School Faculties, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 5, 1990, at 1 (minority professors held about seven percent of law school positions in 1990)
(reporting data released by the Association of American Law Schools). Law professors, how-
ever, constituted only about half the authors on our lists, and we lacked racial information about
most other authors. Gathering additional information about the contributions of minority schol-
ars to the articles most cited by the courts is an important avenue for further research.
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on our lists.100 Examination of these data revealed that women au-
thored a smaller proportion of the articles on our lists than on Sha-
piro's lists. While women wrote thirteen (42%) of the thirty-one
articles on Shapiro's 1989-1991 lists, they authored or coauthored only
seven (24%) of the twenty-nine articles we analyzed.' 0'
The representation of women on our lists, however, still matches
or exceeds their representation among both lawyers and law profes-
sors at the time these articles were written. During the 1988-89 aca-
demic year, women constituted twenty percent of tenure-track
professors at American law schools.' 02 At the same time, they ac-
counted for twenty percent of the legal profession. 0 3 These two
groups form the pools from which most law review articles emerge,
suggesting that women at least held their own in producing the articles
most cited by the courts.1°4
The extraordinary dominance of female and minority scholars on
Shapiro's recent lists probably is linked to the primacy of feminist and
critical race scholarship on those lists.' 0 5 The absence of those per-
100. We excluded the student-authored project, supra note 86, from the following discussion
because a large number of students coauthored that note and information is not available about
any of the individual authors.
101. Similarly, women accounted for 10 (23%) of the 44 authors on our lists. These differ-
ences in the percentage of female authors do not reach statistical significance at conventional
levels (a=.14). This may be due in part to the small population size.
102. Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Note, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Em-
pirical Profile of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 191, 199 (1991).
103. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, REPORT
TO THE A.B.A HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, at 4
(Aug. 10, 1988).
104. We included one student-authored note in these analyses. Women received 42% of the
law degrees conferred in 1990, the year that note was published. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES: Fall, 1991, at 65 (1992). A female student authored the note
appearing on our 1990 "most cited" list. Excluding that student-authored piece from our totals,
women contributed to six (21%) of the twenty-eight articles authored by professionals.
105. The significance of this link, however, is not clear. It is not apparent whether the intel-
lect of these scholars has attracted other academics to their writings, and hence to the subjects
they discuss; or whether an interest in feminist and racial critiques has generated heavy citation
rates to the female and minority authors who disproportionately employ these perspectives. The
theoretical nature of feminist and racial critiques may render these works applicable to a wide
variety of situations, leading to high citation rates.
Some critics have suggested that feminist and critical race scholars are more likely than
other scholars to reference one another's works. See, e.g., Arthur Austin, The Reliability of Cita-
tion Counts in Judgments on Promotion, Tenure, and Status, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 834 (1993).
An empirical investigation by Richard Delgado, however, suggests that these scholars cite white
and minority scholars in an evenhanded manner. See Richard Delgado, The Colonial Scholar:
Do Outsider Authors Replicate the Citation Practices of the Insiders, but in Reverse, CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 971 (1996). Scholars, moreover, have raised the possibility that traditional works ignore
the contributions of women, minorities, and other outsiders. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The
Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561
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spectives from the articles most cited by courts, conversely, may ac-
count for the somewhat lower representation of female scholars on
our lists. Against this background, it is particularly noteworthy that
women authors are so well represented on our lists. Women matched
their representation in the profession on our "most cited" lists, even
though some leading female scholars concentrated on scholarly per-
spectives that found little favor in the courts. 10 6
IV. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
We identified numerous intriguing differences, and a few similari-
ties, between the 1989-1991 articles most cited by judges and those
most cited by academics. These two sets of articles share an interest in
statutory interpretation, as well as some concern with economic analy-
sis. Law professors authoring articles most cited by either courts or
journals also teach at similarly prestigious universities. Beyond these
similarities, however, articles on the two lists diverge sharply in the
subjects they address, the scholarly perspectives they employ, the av-
erage prestige of the journals in which they are published, and several
characteristics of the authors they represent.
We offer these findings with three caveats. First, our roster of
possible differences between the articles most cited by courts and
those most cited by scholarly journals signals directions for future re-
search rather than firm conclusions. The population of articles we
studied was quite small. Additional work is needed to track citation
patterns among judges and scholars for a larger population of articles,
and to confirm whether the trends that we distinguished hold for
larger populations.
Second, although our tentative findings suggest substantial differ-
ences in the citation patterns of courts and scholarly journals, this pre-
liminary study does not reveal whether those distinctions are new.
Indeed, we uncovered some evidence of older articles that weathered
lengthy delays before gaining substantial judicial citations. 10 7 The dif-
ferences we identified, therefore, do not necessarily support specula-
tion about a recent divide between the bench and academia. Now that
we have marked some of the dimensions on which most-cited articles
(1984); Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up
Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1988).
106. Preliminary inquiries suggest that minority authors achieved the same rate of success,
see supra note 99, although we lacked sufficient information about the race of our authors to
draw any more definite conclusions.
107. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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in courts differ from most-cited articles in scholarly journals, it may be
possible to determine whether those differences emerged recently or
parallel differences from earlier periods.
Finally, even if subsequent research confirms the tentative differ-
ences we found in the citation patterns of judges and academic writ-
ers, empirical research cannot determine whether those differences
are appropriate to the different roles of courts and universities. Law
professors are freer than judges to step outside the legal system, to
examine the fundamental premises of that system, and to propose
changes that look decades into the future. The fact that these rumina-
tions enjoy no immediate application in courts or law offices is not
cause for alarm. 10 8 Coase's work on Social Costs did not lose its value
because it languished for twenty years without accumulating a sub-
stantial number of judicial citations. 10 9 Nor is the article less valuable
because its lifetime total of thirty-eight judicial citations lags far be-
hind its 1741 references in legal and social science articles. Academic
works yielding few judicial citations may influence judges indirectly
and may exert even greater influence over legislators and other
decisionmakers.
In addition to these caveats, we note that some of the differences
we identified between courts and scholarly journals should be cause
for celebration rather than despair. The willingness of judges to reach
beyond the work of purely academic authors, articles published by
graduates of elite law schools, and the journals published by those
schools insures that fresh perspectives will continue to infuse the legal
system. Recent complaints of a divide between the bench and legal
academy often focus on a perceived decline in links between courts
and the most prestigious law schools."10 Our preliminary analyses
suggest that these fears are somewhat exaggerated: courts still draw
their most-cited articles disproportionately from the graduates of elite
schools and the pages of their law journals. The fact that courts ven-
108. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 81-108 (1995); Richardson,
supra note 31, at 387 ("It is my thesis that [courts and law reviews] function best when we
recognize our limits. In the context of real cases and controversies, it is difficult to have the
broader vision of the teacher, the statesman or the philosopher which is necessary for the shap-
ing of society. Our functions differ."); Roger J. Traynor, To the Right Honorable Law Reviews,
10 UCLA L. REV. 3, 10 (1962) ("Time is with the law reviews. An age that chums up problems
more rapidly than we can solve them needs such fiercely independent problem-solvers preoccu-
pied with long range solutions.").
109. Cf Posner, supra note 108, at 99 ("A new approach to law, such as the economic ap-
proach, may take a generation or more to alter professional thinking... ; that does not make it
useless.").
110. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 3, at 42.
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ture outside those circles, however, represents a healthy receptivity to
the work of other scholars and institutions.
The relationship between courts and legal scholarship is complex.
This preliminary comparison of citation rates in judicial opinions and
scholarly journals invites further empirical work documenting that re-
lationship through citation patterns and other means. We intend to
pursue these leads, and hope that others similarly will follow the work
begun by Fred Shapiro and the editors of this Symposium.
TABLE 1
ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN 1989
MOST CITED IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS*
Court Law Review
Cites CitesArticle
John E.B. Myers, Jan Bays, et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual
Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. 1.
William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and
Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45.
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405.
Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the
Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257.
David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, Summary Judgments in Texas, 20 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 243.
Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74
MiNN. L. REV. 227.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413.
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm.
L. REV. 153.
H. Alston Johnson, Workers' Compensation, 50 LA. L. REV. 391.
















ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN 1990
MOST CITED IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS*
Court Law Review
Article Cites Cites
William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The
Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV.
495. 25 14
W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Appellate Review in Civil Appeals, 21
ST. MARY'S L.J. 865. 21 5
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 2071. 11 41
Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73. 11 9
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in
Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 265. 10 27
Nancer Ballard & Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy
of the Comprehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 610. 9 7
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321. 7 84
Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Policy,
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821. 7 13
Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable
Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV.
465. 7 0
Harold H. Bruff, Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution, 68
TEX. L. REV. 1337. 7 4
* Articles printed in boldface appear on both judicial and scholarly "top ten" lists.
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TABLE 3
ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN 1991
MOST CITED IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS*
Court Law Review
Article Cites Cites
William Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another Look at "No Evidence"
and "Insufficient Evidence," 69 TEX. L. REV. 515. 37 1
Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901. 13 35
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-
Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731. 12 31
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Debate in the DNA Cases Over the
Foundation for the Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance
of Human Error as a Cause of Forensic Misanalysis, 69 WASH. U.
L.Q. 19. 11 4
William N. Eskridge., Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331. 11 33
Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging
Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1. 10 12
Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior
Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 589. 9 4
Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497. 9 34
The Supreme Court, 1990 Term: Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV.
177. 8 19
Akhfl R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ.
1131. 8 76




1989-1991 ARTICLES MOST CITED BY THE COURTS
DISTRIBUTION OF CITATIONS BY TYPE OF COURT*
Article Military Bankr USDC USCA US S Ct State
68 NEB. L. REV. 1 3 2 1 39
75 VA. L. REV. 45 1 4 34
103 HARV. L. REV. 405 1 5 6 6
67 N.C. L. REV. 257 2 1 14
20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 243 16
74 MINN. L. REV. 227 14 1*
102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 8 3 1 3
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 4 4 6
50 LA. L. REV. 391 1 2 9*
56 U. CH. L. REV. 1175 2 6 3
41 S.C. L. REV. 495 2 22 1*
21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 865 21*
90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 7 3 1*
100 YALE L.J. 73 3 4 3 1*
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265 1 1 8
75 CORNELL L. REV. 610 4 5
42 STAN. L. REV. 321 1 1 1 4
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821 1 4 1 1*
42 STAN. L. REV. 465 1 6
68 TEX. L. REV. 1337 7*
69 TEX. L. REV. 515 37*
58 U. CI. L. REV. 901 3 6 4
104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 3 2 2 5
69 WASH. U. L.Q. 19 1 10
101 YALE L.J. 331 1 7 2 1"
67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 9 1*
76 CORNELL L.Q. 589 2 2 1 4
43 STAN. L. REV. 497 5 3 1*
105 HARV. L. REV. 177 1 3 1 3
100 YALE LJ. 1131 6 2
Military=US Military Appeals Courts/Bankr=Federal Bankruptcy Courts/USDC=Federal
District Courts/USCA=Federal Courts of Appeals/US S Ct=United States Supreme Court/
State=All State Courts/* = State Court Citations Limited to Courts of a Single State
* Articles printed in boldface appear on both judicial and scholarly "top ten" lists.
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TABLE 5
SHAPIRO'S 1989 ARTICLES
MOST CITED IN SCHOLARLY JOURNALS*
Court SSCI Law Review
Article Cites Cites Cites
Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320. 6 193 185
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes In the Regulatory State,
103 HARV. L. REV. 405. 17 145 131
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A
Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411. 0 123 125
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cni.
L. REV. 1175. 11 117 95
Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797. 1 98 111
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE
L.J. 87. 1 95 100
Kimberld W. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139. 1 93 136
Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1745. 1 93 111
Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737. 2 84 81
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1413. 15 82 88





MOST CITED IN SCHOLARLY JOURNALS*
Court SSCI Law Review
Article
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581.
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 829.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 621.
Charles R. Lawrence II, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431.
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321.
Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice
Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95.
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1409.
Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title
VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1749.
Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1699.
Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758.
Cites Cites Cites
4 66 73
* Articles printed in boldface appear on both judicial and scholarly "top ten" lists.
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TABLE 7
SHAPIRO'S 1991 ARTICLES
MOST CITED IN SCHOLARLY JOURNALS*
Court SSCI Law Review
Article
Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE
L.. 1131.
Mar J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination
Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100
YALE L.J. 1329.
Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1419.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under
Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281.
Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate
Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10.
Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV.
971.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277.
Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343.
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 863.
Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act
and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MicH. L. REV.
1077.
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LAW SCHOOL DEGREES OF AUTHORS OF 1989-1991 ARTICLES MOST











































ACADEMIC AFFILIATIONS OF LAW PROFESSOR AUTHORS OF
ARTICLES MOST-CITED BY THE COURTS 1989-1991
Texas 5
Chicago 4
Harvard 3
Georgetown 2
Brooklyn 1
Cornell 1
Davis 1
Duke 1
Fordham 1
McGeorge 1
Minnesota 1
Stanford 1
Yale 1
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